shows that it is not in the rational, self-interest of citizens to vote, or be politically informed, nor participate in the political process, more generally. Much scholarly attention has been given to the first dilemma, and substantially less to the second. The focus of this chapter is on the second dilemma of democracy, that is, that it is not in the selfinterest of citizens to become informed about politics. This neglect of the second enigma is somewhat puzzling, because it is the more serious problem in a democracy. We can increase turnout by reducing the costs of physically voting. But, if individuals remain ignorant of candidates and issues, elections just produce random outcomes.
I review the proposed consumption (civic duty and expressive) explanations and predictions of why individuals acquire political information. A common prediction from these analyses is that independent voters will acquire more political information than partisan voters, who vote on the basis of party labels, not issues.
I then present an alternative analysis of the decision to acquire information in which I modify the self-interest assumption by introducing weak altruism as a motivation for potential voters. I test the predictions for both the expressive and altruistic analyses. Evidence is presented that altruism is the single strongest predictor for the level of information obtained by citizens. By contrast, the evidence rejects the noninstrumental prediction that independents are more politically informed than partisans. Just the opposite holds. Partisans are better informed than independent voters.
Political Information and Voting
As extensively discussed in the first two chapters, a number of competing theories have been proposed to explain why Downs's twin dilemmas do not hold in practice. They all modify the narrow, self-interest assumption that underlies Downs's analysis. The consumption theories have focused on explaining why individuals vote, but not addressed why individuals acquire political information. Recently, there have been attempts to remedy this lacuna, and incorporate civic duty to explain the acquisition of political information. The two studies that best reflect this approach are Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) and Degan (2006) . Their formal models are somewhat different; but, a key prediction emerges that is common to both. Both versions have two types of voters: partisans and independents. Since partisans are committed to vote for their candidate, they have little or no incentive to acquire costly political information. By contrast, only independent voters, because they are not committed to one candidate, acquire political information.
In the Feddersen and Sandroni version an ethical prescription to reduce costs is introduced, but only for independent voters. Partisans are committed to vote for their party, and are relatively uninformed. Thus, one group of independents remains uninformed, and just vote for the candidate that is lagging in support among partisans. This creates a tie between the candidates. Of the remaining independents, one group acquires political information, and then votes. Hence, this group determines the outcome of an election. The second group of independents does not acquire political information, nor do they vote, because their vote is redundant, and there is an ethical rule to minimize the costs of political information for independents. On balance, independents acquire political information when its cost is lesser than the benefit they derive from their sense of performing their civic duty, while partisans do not acquire political information.
How independents coordinate among themselves is not explained. How it is determined which individuals belong to which of the three groups is not explained.
The Degan (2006) analysis differs in structure, but has a similar prediction. Individuals have policy preferences, but experience regret only if they vote for the wrong candidate. They do not experience a benefit from voting for the right candidate. The benefit from doing their civic duty is the only positive benefit they obtain. Because policy moderates vary their vote between Democrat or Republican, depending upon the
